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STEVEN E. CLYDE*

Adapting to the Changing Demand
for Water Use Through Continued
Refinement of the Prior
Appropriation Doctrine:
An Alternative Approach to
Wholesale Reallocation
ABSTRACT
The priorappropriationdoctrinefacilitatedwestern expansion and
economic growth in the aridWest. The doctrine rewarded those who
were first by providing them with a relatively stable water supply by
protecting them from unreasonable interference by junior appropriators. Beneficial use generally requiredboth the diversion and consumption of water in some economic activity. Today, society recognizes
other values in water. Some peoplefear that the priorappropriation
doctrine may prevent the use of water for these non-consumptive
purposes and are searchingfor novel legal theories to circumvent
it. This effort is unnecessary. The doctrine is inherentlyflexible. Given
time, it will be adapted to meet the competing needs and interests
of society. The prior appropriationdoctrine is not an obstacle to
change. We do need, however, sufficient time to discern the true
direction of our rapidly changing societal values.
INTRODUCTION

The prior appropriation doctrine originated from custom and usage in
the early mining camps and irrigated farms of the West. Its basic tenetfirst in time is first in right-rewarded those who were simply first, with
little regard to the efficiency or economy of their use, or whether more
beneficial uses of water were being precluded.' Beneficial use became
*Director-Shareholder in the Salt Lake City, Utah law firm of Clyde, Pratt and Snow, P.C. His
practice emphasizes natural resources law, with a primary emphasis on water law. He has been a
frequent lecturer on water rights transfer issues, and has published numerous papers. He served as
vice-chairman of the Water Resources Committee of the Natural Resources Law section of the
American Bar Association for three years. He chaired that committee for the period 1985-1986
through 1987-1988, and has recently been elected to serve on the governing Council of the Natural
Resources Law Section. He is also the Chairman elect of the Energy and Natural Resources Law
Section of the Utah State Bar Association.
1.R. DEWSNUP & D.JENSEN, A SUMMARY-DtGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS, 475, 719 (1973).
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the measure and the limit of the water right.' To be beneficial, the use
must promote economic activities, and generally there must be actual
diversion and consumption of water.3
Once perfected,' the water right becomes a vested, perpetual property
interest subject only to prior rights and the possible assertion of dominant
federal interest. The water right is entitled to full legal protection including
due process. 5 The protection of prior rights has been given express judicial
sanction as a matter of "natural justice." 6
The policy of most western states has been to maximize the economic
development and use of its water resources.' Little thought was given in
the early days of western settlement to water conservation, or to the
protection of the environmental or aesthetic values in water resources.
Conservation, to the extent it was addressed, entailed the storage of the
random flows of mountain streams for late season irrigation use.
The federal government's acquiescence in the settlement of the West
and the appropriation of water rights under state law promoted western
migration and the expansion of our national economy. The doctrine of
"first in time, first in right" assured the early settlers of a relatively stable
water supply and protected them against interference by junior appropriators. The doctrine served the West well in the past. Today, however,
it has the potential to impede the reallocation of water resources to new
uses. Strict application of the doctrine may even create artificial legal
water shortages by protecting inefficient or unperfected water rights and
uses from interference by junior appropriators.
The prior appropriation doctrine does not need to be an obstacle to
change. It is inherently flexible. It can be adapted to meet today's changing
economic, social, and environmental concerns. For example, non-diversionary, instream rights were essentially unheard of ten years ago. The
only limited exceptions in the West were for livestock water from a stream
2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§73-1-3 (1980).

3. Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194 (1930); Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah
212, 108 P. 1112 (1910). See generally Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Beneficial Use in the
Law of Surface Streams, 12 WYO. L.J. I (1957).
4. Perfection means that water has physically been put to use. Once an application is approved,
the applicant is given a specific amount of time within which to complete the construction of his
diversion works and to place the water to beneficial use. An applicant may be granted additional
time within which to complete the appropriation upon a showing of diligence or reasonable cause
for delay. Diligence requires the applicant to make a reasonable effort to accomplish his undertaking
with the dispatch expected of men engaged in a like enterprise, who desire a speedy accomplishment
of their designs. Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Ass'n, 10 Utah 2d 376, 353 P.2d 916

(1960).
5. See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153 (9th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Lincoln Land
Co., 27 F.Supp. 972 (D.C. Wyo. 1939); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421,

94 P. 339 (1908).
6. Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507, 512 (1874).
7. R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, supra note I at 475, 719.
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and the floating of logs to market.' Today, several western states have
given instream rights judicial or legislative sanction. 9

Further change in the prior appropriation doctrine will occur as a natural
consequence of the shift in societal values and economic forces in the
West. It is not necessary to force change through the grafting of theories
such as the Public Trust Doctrine onto the prior appropriation doctrine.'
This paper demonstrates the inherent flexibility of the prior appropriation
doctrine and its adoption to accommodate societal and economic change.
The author is a practitioner in Utah and, as a result, the majority of
the examples are drawn from that state. Virtually every example using

Utah as the basis for illustration reflects a problem throughout the West.
PROTECTION OF EXISTING RIGHTS THROUGH THE
RULE AGAINST INTERFERENCE

A water right acquired under the appropriation doctrine becomes a
vested, perfected property interest." It is entitled to protection against

unreasonable interference from other water users.'" An appropritor may
change his or her place of use, nature of use, or point of diversion of his
or her
not an
of use
senior

water right.' 3 The right to change is held to be an inherent, but
absolute right. '"The right to change is qualified in that a change
may be made only so long as no other rights, whether junior or
in priority, are impaired. 5

8. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1 72 P.2d 648 (1937). But see
Vaughn v. Kolb, 130 Or. 506, 280 P. 518 (1929); Robinson v. Schoenfelt, 62 Utah 233, 218 P.
1041 (1923).
9. Ritter v. Standal, 98 Idaho 446, 566 P.2d 769 (1977); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v.
Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't
of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974); Coto. REV. STAT. §37-92-102(3) (1986);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-1409(2)(f) (1986); IDAHO CODE § 42-1409(2)(f) (1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§73-3-7 (Supp. 1988); Wvo. STAT. §§41-3-1001 to 41-3-1014 (Supp. 1986).
10. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189
Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (the court held that perfected water rights may
be reconsidered where their exercise threatens certain public values in water resources); see also
United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal.App.3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986);
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983);
Gait v. State, 44 Mont. 103, 731 P.2d 912 (1987); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v.
Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,
210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
1l. Hunter v. United States, 388 F2d 148, 153 (9th Cir. 1967).
12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988); East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d
170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-301 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-523 to -24 (1985).
13. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988).
14. Langenegger v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 82 N.M. 416, 483 P.2d 297 (1971); White v.
Wheatland Irrigation Dist., 413 P.2d 252 (Wyo. 1966).
15. Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 171 Colo. 304, 467 P.2d 267 (1970); Zezi v. Lightfoot,
57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 (1937); Thompson v. Harvey, 164 Mont. 133, 519 P.2d 963 (1974); City
of Roswell v. Reynolds, 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974); Vandehey v. Wheeler, 13 Or. App.
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Under most change of use statutes, an appropriator may reallocate his
or her water to other beneficial uses any number of times without loss
of their original date of priority. 6 This is clearly of importance. It allows
appropriators to reallocate their water to new uses, while still being

assured of protection against interference by other water users. The requirement of non-interference, however, limits the nature and extent of

any such change of use by the appropriator. The proposed change of use
may not interfere with the vested rights of others, nor may the water
right be expanded by virtue of the change of use."
Interference means the deprivation of water. It may occur in any number
of ways. An appropriator may seek to change his or her point of diversion
along a stream or from a surface stream to the underground basin. The
new point of diversion may enable the appropriator to intercept water
that previously reached the points of diversion of others downstream,

thereby depriving them of the water they need to satisfy their vested
rights. The appropriator may change his or her place of use so that the

return flow from this use may return to another drainage basin. The water
may return at a point in time when the downstream appropriator may no
longer need it or be able to use it. The point of return may also change

so that water returns to the same water course, but at a point below where
downstream user may gain access to the water.
Downstream water users generally acquire a vested right against all

upstream water users to have stream conditions remain substantially as
they were when they made their appropriations. " This right extends both
to the time of year when the water is needed and to quantity of water
available. 9 Any excessive disruption to the established return flow pattern
by an upstream junior appropriator will not be tolerated if these fluctua25, 507 P.2d 831 (1973);

ALASKA STAT.

§46.15.160 (1987);

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN,

§45-172

(1987); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1700-1706 (West 1971); CoLo. REV. STAT § 37-92-302 (Supp. 1987);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-108-211 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b (1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. §46-250 (1984); NEv. REV. STAT. §§533.325, .345 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-5-24
(1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §61-04-15.1 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.4, 105.5 (West.
Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. §540.510 (1987); S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. § 46-5-31 (1987); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.380, 90.03.390 (Supp. 1987);
Wyo. STAT. §§41-4-404, -405 (1987).
Until 1965, Wyoming law did not provide for changes in the point of diversion. White v. Wheatland
Irrigation Dist., 413 P.2d 252 (Wyo. 1966); see ch. 138, § 1, 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws 374 (current
version at Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-104 (Supp. 1988)); Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case
Studies of the Transfers of Water Rights. I LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1966).
16. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988).
17. IDAHO CODE §42-222 (Supp. 1988); W. S. Ranch v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 79 N.M. 65, 439
P.2d 714 (1968); Tanner v. Humphreys. 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484 (1935).
18. Off v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217 (Colo. 1988); Piute Reservoir &
Irrigation Co. v. West Panguitch Irrigation Co., 13 Utah 2d 6, 367 P.2d 855 (1962); East Bench
Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954).
19. East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Utah, 5 Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603 (1963).
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tions unreasonably interfere with prior vested rights. The law requires
this result, and the rule has been strictly enforced.' The necessity to
protect vested rights against unreasonable interference could be a deterrent
to the reallocation of water to new uses. That, however, has not proven
to be the case.
THE STATE ENGINEER'S ROLE IN MITIGATING IMPACTS
State Engineers have a variety of choices when reviewing a new appropriation or a change of use. Conditions may be imposed in approving
either an application to appropriate or to change the use of water to
minimize interference. 2 These may include restrictions on the duration
of pumping, limiting the depth of a well, or specifying the zone from
which well production may occur. An application may be approved in
part (authorizing a change of use of only a portion of the underlying
right), or restricted as to the time of year or total diversion of water that
can be made during the year. State Engineers must deny an application
if the interference cannot otherwise be mitigated.22
THE APPLICANT'S ABILITY TO VOLUNTARILY
MITIGATE INTERFERENCE
Junior appropriators of groundwater, whose appropriation or change
of use may interfere with the rights of others, may make perpetual replacement at his or her own expense.23 If the cost of replacement is too
steep, it may discourage the junior appropriator from attempting further
water development or reallocating water to some new use, thus perpetuating the old and possibly inefficient use of the water. The appropriator
might acquire the conflicting right thereby mooting the controversy altogether. In Utah, an appropriator is granted a right of eminent domain
to assist him or her in doing so.24 The cost of acquisition may curtail the
use of this remedy as well.
The law favors change provided that the rights of others are not damaged in the process. The risk of interference is on the junior appropriator. 2
If, however, the costs of mitigation are placed totally on the junior appropriator, it may restrict the reallocation of water to non-revenue producing uses. The costs of mitigation may simply be too steep for anyone
20. United States v. District Court, 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952).
21. See e.g., id. at 20, 242 P.2d at 775; Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 99 N.M. 84, 86, 654 P.2d
537, 539 (1982) (citing supporting cases and statute).
22. See, e.g., Tanner v. Humphreys, 87 Utah 164, 48 P.2d 484, 487 (1935) (citing UTAH Rev.
STAT. §§ 100-3-3, -4 (1933)).
23. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-23 (1980).
24. Id.
25. Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114 P. 147 (1911).
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to incur but those who can afford to reallocate water to some higher
economic use.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Current Creek IrrigationCompany
v. Andrews, 6 that a subsequent groundwater appropriator must drill a
deep replacement well, equip it and pay the power bills perpetually as a
condition to using his new wells. The new wells had lowered the water
table, thereby reducing the artesian pressure in the aquifer to a point
where the senior appropriator could no longer obtain its water without
pumping its wells. The holding of the court essentially assured the senior
appropriator a vested right to a full underground reservoir and artesian
pressure.
Under the Andrews rule, each new appropriator would be faced with
the economic burden of providing replacement water to every more senior
appropriator in the basin. Had this policy prevailed throughout the West,
groundwater development would be limited to only those with sufficient
economic resources to pay the extreme costs of replacement to all senior
appropriators or the acquisition of all senior rights.
The strict application of the rule against interference by the Andrews
court appeared too restrictive to other courts. They circumvented the rule
by redefining interference in the groundwater context to facilitate more
full development of this valuable water resource. For example, the New
Mexico Supreme Court in City of Roswell v. Reynolds,27 held that the
lowering of the groundwater table did not by itself constitute interference
with another's water right. The court suggested that impairment might
occur only where the lowering of the groundwater table caused a reduction
in water quality. The Supreme Court of Colorado has taken a similar
position. In City of Colorado Springs v. Bender" the Court held that an
owner of a shallow well was not entitled to enjoin the pumping of a
deeper well on the basis that it might impair his earlier priority water
right. The Court affirmed his priority, but stated that the obligation of
any appropriator of water is to provide a reasonable means of effectuating
his or her own diversion. The prior appropriator could not assert his
priority as a means of commanding the entirety of the water supply in
order to protect his ability to withdraw only a fraction of the whole. No
injunction would issue unless the appropriator demonstrated that his means
of diversion were reasonably adequate to meet the historical purposes of
his appropriation. Other states have followed this approach. 29
26. 9 Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959); see also Salt Lake City v. Gardner, 39 Utah 30, 114
P. 147 (1911).
27. 86 N.M. 249, 522 P.2d 796 (1974).
28. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
29. WYo. STAT. §41-141 (Supp. 1988); Baker v. ORE-IDA Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d
627 (1973); Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 172 N.J. Super. 489, 412 A.2d 1064 (1980);
Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861 (1969).
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More recently, in Alamosa-La Jara Water UsersProtectionAssociation
v. Gould,3" the junior appropriators were depleting the surface stream.
Their heavy groundwater withdrawals caused increased recharge from
the surface stream to the groundwater aquifer. The Supreme Court of
Colorado suggested that the senior appropriator's historic method of diversion should not stand as an impediment to full utilization of the available water resource by junior appropriators. The Court held that where
the surface and groundwater sources were integrated, a senior surface
appropriator may be required to withdraw underground water tributaries
to the stream in order to satisfy his or her appropriation.
The Court further suggested that a junior appropriator may be assessed
a portion of the cost of improving the senior appropriators means of
diversion, where those improvements were necessitated by the junior's
diversion." So long as those costs are reasonably within the junior appropriator's ability to pay, this requirement should not be too serious an
impediment to change.
The senior appropriator's right is vested. It is clearly entitled to recognition and legal protection from unreasonable interference. However,
it is not unreasonable to impose at least some of the costs of mitigation
on the senior appropriator where his or her means of diversion are inefficient or wasteful. The courts must strike a reasonable balance in
determining where the economic burden should fall. 2
A NEEDED REFINEMENT-PROVIDING INCENTIVES
FOR CONSERVATION
In the law, it is well established that a water right cannot be enlarged
by virtue of a change of use. The enlargement or increased consumption
of water may cause interference with the rights of downstream appropriators. Thus, an appropriator who changes his or her point of diversion
from one tributary to another cannot withdraw more water from the new
point of diversion than would have been available to them at their historic
point of diversion.3 3 Similarly, an appropriator generally cannot use the
water he or she saves through employing more efficient means of application to irrigate additional land. This rule is based on the notion that
applying the same amount of water to a larger surface area may increase
evaporation and decrease return flow, thereby increasing consumptive use
of water. Since water rights are limited to that quantity needed for the
purposes of the original appropriation, such an expansion is prohibited.
30.
31.
32.
33.

674 P.2d 914 (Coto. 1983).
Id. at 935.
Id.
Rocky Ford lrr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108 (1943).
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This rule, however, makes no sense where consumptive use is not increased, as in the case of a change to a drip trickle irrigation system or
to sprinklers. Its application also creates little incentive to curtail existing
flood irrigation practices. Water lost through seepage or evaporation in
open irrigation ditches and canals can be saved through a variety of
conservation measures. Cement lining or piping an open ditch is expensive. Because the law is unsettled as to who actually owns the water
salvaged through conservation efforts," the economic return is rarely
worth the investment."
In Utah, an appropriator must file an application to appropriate the
conserved water if he or she intends to legally use it." To be approved,
the appropriator must demonstrate that the water conserved was not already appropriated by others and must also meet the other statutory criteria
for a new appropriation. 37 If the appropriation is approved, the water
right acquired is the most junior priority right on the stream. It is also
one of the first rights curtailed during times of drought or other shortages.
Thus, little economic incentive exists to abandon wasteful irrigation practices.
Economic incentives can be created to encourage conservation. One
such effort is under discussion in the Imperial Irrigation District of California as a result of a 1984 decision of the California State Water Resources Control Board.3" The board concluded that the Imperial Valley
irrigators were wasting water in violation of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution. The district was ordered to eliminate its high
seepage loss and excessive return flow to the Salton Sea. The Metropolitan
Water Board of Los Angeles provided the economic incentive to try. The
irrigation district and the water board are working to salvage water previously lost to seepage and evaporation. The Metropolitan Water Board
offered to provide the financing for the water conservation activities. The
economic incentive to the Metropolitan Water District is the acquisition
of an additional approximate 100,000 acre feet of water annually for
municipal and industrial use in Los Angeles. This water has previously
been lost to everyone. The incentive to the irrigators is the elimination
of potential liability for flood damages to land adjacent to the Salton Sea,
and the prospect of selling this salvaged water to Los Angeles. Thus, a
34. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d 201 (1966).
35. Reno v. Richards, 32 Idaho 1, 178 P. 81 (1918); Howcroft v. Union & Jordan Irr. Co., 25
Utah 311, 71 P. 487 (1903).
36. Howcroft, 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487.
37. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 56 Utah 196, 189 P. 587 (1919); Howcroft
v. Union & Jordan Irr. Co., 25 Utah 311, 71 P. 487 (1903); R. DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, supra note
1, at 719.
38. Imperial lrr. Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 231 Cal.
Rptr. 283 (1986); Elmore v. Imperial lrr. Dist., 159 Cal. App. 3d 185, 205 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1984).
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liability has the potential of becoming a salable, valuable asset.
The Imperial Valley is essentially at the tail end of the Colorado River
system. There are few downstream appropriators in the United States
who could assert a prior claim to this salvaged water. Mexico's share of
the Colorado river is protected by Treaty.39 California has also adopted
a statute which rewards the conserver of water with title to the salvaged
water.' This insures the appropriator of the right to sell and obtain a
return on the dollars invested in conservation.
Thus, this project may succeed where others may fail. However, the
legal uncertainties over title and the right to use or sell the salvaged water
have not yet been resolved. These legal uncertainties impede conservation
efforts. These risks and expenses simply outweigh the gains to make
conservation worth the effort.
The law should reward those who conserve by giving them clear title
to the water they salvage through conservation. Title alone may not be
sufficient incentive to promote conservation. If the priority of the salvaged
water is the most junior on the stream, the existence of a valid title
provides little comfort during times of shortage.
In some states, State Engineers could add additional incentives for
conservation by defining the salvage practice to be in the "public interest." 4 For example, in Utah, an application to appropriate salvaged water
could be moved ahead of a prior pending application which the State
Engineer considers to be less in the public interest. A priority earlier than
other applications waiting in line could affort a degree of protection for
this conserved and appropriated water right, thus encouraging its development.
OTHER POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
State Engineers generally lack express statutory authority to expand
the season of use or to change the period of diversion.4 2 There is case
authority that the protection against unreasonable interference afforded
to downstream appropriators extends not only to the quantity of water
being used, but also to the time of year when water is used.43
39. Treaty Respecting the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Rivers, Feb. 3-Nov. 14, 1944,
United States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 944.
40. Pomona Land & Water Co. v. San Antonio Water Co., 152 Cal. 618, 93 P. 881 (1908); CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1011, 1012, 1013 (1987); CAL. WATER CODE § 1010 (1978). See I H. ROGERs & A.
NICHOLS, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA 375 (1967).
41. See infra, text accompanying notes 50-56.
42. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988), expressly authorizes changes in the place and nature
of use and in the point of diversion.
43. Harkey v. Smith, 31 N.M. 521, 247 P. 550 (1926); East Bench Irrigation Co. v. Utah, 5
Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603 (1956).
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The irrigation season, at least in the mountainous West, is clearly
seasonal. It runs roughly from the first of April to the end of October of
each year. Irrigation rights generally yield the largest quantity of water
available for a change of use simply because irrigation use consumes a
great quantity of water. Thus, irrigation rights have been generally more
attractive for acquisition and conversion to new uses than fights appropriated for some less consumptive use. They also generally have some
of the earliest dates of priority on a given stream system. This affords
some insurance in case of drought or other shortage conditions.
Industrial water users generally need water on a year-round basis, rather
than during a seven-month irrigation season. The inability to convert
seasonal irrigation fights into year-round municipal and industrial uses
threatened to lock many states into an agrarian economy and push industrial growth and economic expansion into neighboring states without
such rigid policies. Practicality, however, has prevailed. In states such
as Utah, even though no express statutory authority exists to alter the
season of diversion and use, the Utah State Engineer has approved change
applications that request an expanded season of use as a matter of administrative policy. In doing so, strict conditions have been imposed
governing the volume of water that can be both diverted and depleted
from the river system through the new use. This helps ensure that no
more water will be consumed through the new use, even though the
period of diversion and use is expanded to a year-round basis.
Thus, the prior appropriation doctrine has not prevented the reallocation
of seasonal irrigation rights to year round municipal and industrial uses
in Utah, even when no express legal authority may exist. The uses have
changed as a natural consequence of the change in the economic base of
the West. Vested rights have been protected without disrupting the orderly
transition of land and water use to accommodate the urbanization of the
West.
ADOPTION TO CHANGE THROUGH INTERCHANGES
OF WATER SOURCES
In some western states, an appropriator may exchange his or her water
source for another, so long as he or she can replace the same quantity of
water to those downstream."4
An exchange often involves the use of water in storage. The individual
enters into an agreement with the owner of the stored water. The agreement provides the individual the right to divert and use some tributary
44. Daniels v. Adair, 38 Idaho 130, 220 P. 107 (1923); IDAHO CODE §41-3-104 (1977); see also
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-24 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-20 (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 102,
103 (Supp. 1988).
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source of water, either upstream or downstream from the reservoir, in
exchange for which an identical quantity of water is released from storage
to meet the rights of those downstream. The individual must also file an
application to exchange with the State Engineer and gain State Engineer
approval of an exchange application before he or she may use the water
by exchange. 45 The exchange application is approved if replacement can
be made and no interference occurs at the new point of diversion.'
Exchange applications are fairly unusual in water law in that there is
no requirement that they ever be perfected. Most water right appropriation
statutes require the appropriator to construct diversion works and place
the water to beneficial use within the statutory time period. 47 The application is lapsed if this is not accomplished.'
An exchange application is based upon a perfected right. It involves
an exchange of water sources rather than constituting a new appropriation
of water. Consequently, there is no requirement that the exchanged water
ever be put to beneficial use. Although the owner of an exchange application is not required to use the water, he or she nevertheless has an
approved water right. This right is entitled to be protected from unreasonable interference. This anomaly can lead to some interesting results.
In the Park City, Utah recreational area, water users have contracted
for approximately 10,000 acre feet of water per year to be used by
exchange through the release of stored water. The water is to be diverted
from numerous individually owned wells upstream from the reservoir.
Approximately half of this water is currently in use. The remaining 5,000
acre feet of water is annually held under approved contracts and approved
exchanged applications-primarily by land speculators-but is unused.
The water Was subscribed for to assist in the development of real property
in the ski resort and recreational areas near Park City, Utah.
The economic downturn of the mid-1980s brought land development
in this area to a halt. As a result, the water has gone unused, but is still
tied under contract and approved exchange applications that, under Utah
law, could not be lapsed. Their existence prevented the State Engineer
from approving any other exchanges due to his fear that approval of any
further upstream exchanges may over-draft the safe-yield of this ground
water basin if these previously approved exchanges ever came into use.
They also prevented the owner of the stored water upon which the exchanges are based from selling this water to others who have the need
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-20 (Supp. 1988).
46. Almo Water Co. v. Darrington, 95 Idaho 16, 501 P.2d 700 (1972); Little Cottonwood Water
Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 289 P. 116 (1930); United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P.
434 (1924).
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-12 (Supp. 1988).
48. Id.
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and interest in using it. Thus, the existence of the previously approved
but unused exchange applications have created a cloud over further
groundwater development in this area of the state.
Utah amended its exchange application statute in 1985 largely in response to this situation.49 The State Engineer may now require an applicant
to provide him with information, on request, demonstrating that the exchange is in fact occurring and that the applicant has the legal right to
use the underlying water right for the exchange. The State Engineer may
lapse an exchange application if: the water right upon which the exchange
is based has terminated; if the exchange can no longer be carried out as
contemplated in the application; or if the applicant fails to comply with
any conditions prescribed by the State Engineer in approving the exchange. One condition being frequently inserted today is that the water
so exchanged be placed in use within a prescribed period of time. Failure
to do so will result in the lapsing of the exchange, thus freeing up water
for other existing uses.
MEETING CHANGING DEMANDS THROUGH USE OF
"PUBLIC INTEREST" CRITERIA
State Engineers could aid the prior appropriation doctrine to adapt to
changes through a more expanded use of their public interest powers.
Many states recognize a public interest component in a water right.' The
public interest component has been expressed in a variety of ways, but
always in vague and general terms. For example, Utah defines it as an
application that will interfere with a more beneficial use of the water for
other purposes, or one that will prove detrimental to the public welfare
or the natural stream environment. 5 Wyoming authorizes its State Engineer to deny an application that threatens to prove detrimental to the
public interest.52 These determinations are left to the State Engineer. State
Engineers are not necessarily the best judges of what is or is not in the
public interest. However, the initial decision must be made by someone.
State Engineer decisions are subject to judicial review so that an appropriator whose application is denied on public interest grounds may seek
redress if the State Engineer has been too zealous in asserting his or her
authority.
The extent of the public interest power of a State Engineer is largely
untested. If used properly, it could be a powerful tool to assist in encouraging conservation and the reallocation of water to new uses. For
49. Id. at §73-3-20.
50. IDAHO CODE §42-1737 (Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §533.370 (1986); N.M. STAT, ANN.
§ 72-5-7 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 41-203 (1977).
51. UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-8 (Supp. 1988).
52. WYO. STAT. §41-203 (1977).
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example, State Engineers and their counterparts might use their public
interest powers to require appropriators to abandon their wasteful and
inefficient diversion and application practices as a condition to approval
of a change application or a new application to appropriate. California
has taken this idea to the extreme by giving its Water Resources Control
Board authority to impose conservation measures designed to protect the
public's interest in the state's water on existing vested rights. 3 Other
states have vested their State Enginers with broad regulatory powers to
protect their groundwater supplies from over-drafting. 54
The public interest standard has been asserted only sparingly in the
past. It is not well defined either in the statutes or in the cases that have
employed it to defeat or promote a particular use or project over another.
One of the early public interest decisions was by the Utah Supreme Court
in 1943 in Tanner v. Bacon.5 5 There, the Court approved a junior multipurpose application over a senior single-purpose application in the same
stream. While the Court did not clearly articulate that the public interest
should be controlling, it did hold that where a large multi-purpose project
was ready for construction, the project should be given preference over
the other more speculative, competing power projects.
The storage project would have provided municipal water for numerous
cities as well as irrigation water for thousands of acres of new farm land.
It also had incidental public benefits, such as flood control, power generation and recreation. The private power project would have taken the
river flow out and above and returned it to the river below the dam site.
Thus, the two projects could not co-exist. The Court agreed that the multipurpose project should be approved with a priority ahead of the prior and
competing power application. Other public interest decisions have reached
similar results.56
The public interest statutes generally lack specific guidelines for application. In the absence of express legislative policies, the courts and
administrative agencies have been reluctant to stray too far from traditional views regarding water appropriation, priorities, and development.
Individual appropriators could further this process by agreeing to the
sequential use of the same water supply. The State Engineer could approve
53. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1986).
54. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45-401-45-637 (West Supp. 1988); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 537.010,
537.515 to 537.745, 537.620 (1988); Wyo. STAT. §§41-126, 41-127 through 41-131 (1977).
55. 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957.
56. Johnson Rancho County Water Dist. v. State Water Rights Bd. 235 Cal. App. 863, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 589 (1965); East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dep't of Pub. works, I Cal.2d 476, 35 P.2d 1027
(1934); Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985); Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15
N.M. 666, I10 P.1045 (1910); City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Comm'n, 407 S.W. 2d 752
(Tex. 1966); Big Horn Power Co. v. State, 23 Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915).
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the application in the public interest, knowing that the more senior right
that might have been impaired by the new appropriation is no longer an
obstacle and need not be protected against interference. This arrangement
could last indefinitely, or for a period of years equal to the useful life of
the favored use or project. Upon the end of the project's useful life, the
deferred use could commence.
This process would allow a desired project or use to go forward with
reduced fear that its water rights would be stripped from it through the
assertion of priority by some earlier priority right. It also allows two
water users to utilize the same water right thereby reducing pressure to
develop additional water supplies. The remaining undeveloped water could
be left in the stream for in-stream uses, or appropriated to some other
beneficial use. The parties could negotiate the issue of what constitutes
adequate consideration for the deferral of the senior appropriator's use
of water. If the junior user is willing to pay the senior user more for not
using the water than the senior would gain by using it, chances are greater
that the water will remain unused by the senior.
PROMOTING ADAPTION TO CHANGE THROUGH BETTER
USE OF RETURN FLOWS
Much of the readily developable water in the West is already fully
appropriated and in use. The economics of developing the remaining
unappropriated water is questionable, and may never be politically feasible again. It is more probable that this water will be withdrawn from
further appropriation to protect in-stream flows for fish habitat or wilderness areas. Thus, future economic growth and development may well
depend upon the better utilization of existing appropriated water rights
and developed resources.
One water source that goes largely unused in the West is treated sewage
effluent from municipal treatment plants. Although sewage effluent usually is not treated to potable standards, it can be used for irrigation and
some industrial uses. This would make higher quality water available for
other uses without developing additional water resources to meet these
needs: The law regarding the right of ownership and the use of sewage
effluent, however, is unsettled. This uncertainty creates a legal constraint
on the ability of municipalities to sell or lease this available and potentially
valuable water resource. It also restrains State Engineers from approving
applications to appropriate, or from allowing other uses of effluent water
to occur.
In many states, a city has the legal ability to recapture and re-use its
sewage effluent within its boundaries for uses consistent with its original
appropriation. 7 This is consistent with the rule of law applied to some
57. Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 99 N.M. 84, 654 P.2d 537 (1982).
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appropriators regarding their right of recapture and re-use.58 The conflict
develops when the effluent is made available for new uses outside the
city or for uses not covered by the original appropriation.
The above concept is based on the legal doctrine that so long as water
remains within the dominion and control of the original appropriator, he
or she has the right to recapture and re-use it so long as he or she has
some beneficial use for the water and the use is not beyond the original
appropriation. 9 Any water allowed to escape the original appropriator
may be intercepted and used by others before it reaches the natural water
course, and in some instances, it may even be appropriated by them."
A problem with this doctrine is that the downstream junior appropriators
acquire no vested rights against upstream appropriators that could entitle
them to compel the upstream appropriator to continue wasting water for
their benefit. 6' At the same time, the upstream use has no right to sell
because, once the wastewater reaches a natural water course, it loses its
identity as the property of the upstream appropriator. It becomes part of
the public water supply and is available for reappropriation by those
downstream.62
While one cannot compel continued upstream waste, downstream water
users relying on irrigation return flows are entitled to rely upon the continued availability of return flow water to help satisfy their vested rights.6'
A proposed change of use by an upstream water user may be enjoined if
it threatens to impair his or her ability to receive it. 64 Fortunately, as just
noted above, this expectation of continued irrigation return flows does
not go so far as to require an inefficient irrigator to continue inefficient
irrigation practices. No appropriator can compel another to continue to
waste water for the benefit of the former.65 The upstream appropriator
may cease to irrigate or may modify his or her irrigation practice to more
efficiently utilize his or her water. In some states, they may recapture
and reuse all of their own wastewater so that all water diverted by the
upstream appropriators is fully consumed. In the case of 100 percent
58. McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952); Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co.
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948); Fuss v. Franks, 610 P.2d 17
(Wyo. 1980).
59. Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co., 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249; Thayer v. City of Rawlins,
594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979).
60. ORE. REV. STAT. §537.160 (1963); Wedgworth v. Wedgworth, 20 Ariz. 518, 181 P. 952
(1919); Lambeye v. Garcia, 18 Ariz. 178, 157 P. 977 (1916).
61. City of Boulder v. Boulder and Left Hand Ditch Co., 192 Colo. 219, 557 P.2d 1182 (1976);
Sebem v. Moore, 44 Idaho 410, 258 P. 176 (1927); Ryan v. Gallio, 52 Nev. 330, 286 P. 963 (1930);
McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952); Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 77
Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593 (1957).
62. Pulaski Inf. Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 70 Colo. 565, 203 P. 681 (1922); Wyoming
Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925).
63. Brantley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 92 N.M. 280, 587 P.2d 427 (1978).
64. East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954).
65. Bower v. Big Hom Canal Ass'n, 77 Wyo. 80, 307 P.2d 593 (1957).
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consumptive use through improved efficiency, no water is returned to the
water course. Alternatively, there may be return flow to the stream, but
at a different location. No downstream appropriator has standing to object

to loss of this waste water.
The same rule has apparently been applied in the case of sewage
effluent. Downstream users have no vested rights in the point of return
or discharge of municipal sewage effluent even where the effluent has
been allowed to return to the water course.' It has also been held that
State Engineers have no authority to condition a change of use by a city
in a way that would force a municipality to continue wasting effluent for

the benefit of those downstream."
Thus, cities in some states may recapture and reuse their sewage effluent
with minimal regard to the impact on those downstream provided, however, that the reuse is consistent with the original appropriation. If the
city can recapture and reuse it, it could probably also sell or lease the
water to another for use within its corporate boundaries. There remains
a split of authority as to the cities' title to such wastewater, and as to
the ability to use it to serve areas outside the original boundaries of the
municipalities .'
The problem of title and out-of-boundary use of sewage effluent is
compounded in Utah7" by a state constitutional provision that prohibits
cities from leasing, selling or otherwise permanently encumbering or

alienating their water rights or water works. 7'

Thus, a variety of legal uncertainties to the use of sewage effluent still
exist. These uncertainties may impede the use of one of our more continuously available sources of water-a use which would free higher
quality water for other desirable purposes.
66. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 179
Colo. 36, 499 P.2d 1190 (1972); Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979).
67, Reynolds v. City of Roswell, 99 N.M. 84, 654 P.2d 537 (1982).
68, Benson v. Burges, 192 Colo. 556, 561 P.2d 1 (1977); Schulz v. Sweeny, 19 Nev. 359, If
Co.
P. 253 (1886); Vaughan v. Kolb, 130 Or. 506, 280 P. 518 (1929); Smithfield West Bench Inr.
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866, 870 (1943) (Wolfe, J. concurring),
aff'd, 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948).
69. Brian v. Fremont Ihr. Co., 112 Utah 220, 186 P.2d 588 (1947); Manning v. Fife, 17 Utah
232, 54 P. I I (1898).
70. UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 6.
71. The intent of the provision is to preserve the water supplies and water works for the future
needs of a city's inhabitants. The effect of this provision, however, is to prohibit cities that have
suffered declining populations from selling water rights that are surplus to their foreseeable needs.
A city in Utah is authorized by statute to sell water, as distinguished from the water right, for
use outside its boundaries, provided that the water being sold is currently surplus to the city's needs.
Any such sale, however, is subject to a perpetual right of recall by the city in the event the water
is no longer surplus. Therefore, any sale of effluent or other surplus waters to another for use beyond
the city's boundaries would be interruptible and unreliable. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-14 (1986);
County Water Sys., Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah 2d 46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954).
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IMPROVING EFFICIENCY OF THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM THROUGH SALES OF SHARES
IN MUTUAL WATER COMPANIES
Much of the irrigation water in the West is held in the name of mutual
irrigation companies. These companies were formed by water users who
banded together through the formal structure of a corporation to facilitate
the efficient and economical distribution of their water and the construction and maintenance of their diversion and distribution facilities.
The incorporators conveyed their water rights to the corporation in
exchange for stock certificates. Legal title to the water right was held by
the corporation. 7 2 Equitable title and the right to beneficially use the water
was retained by the individual shareholders."
The shares of stock in a mutual company represent a proportionate
ownership interest in the water rights and distribution facilities of the
company.74 It entitles the sharesholder to call for his or her undivided
portion of the water rights in accordance with the company's method of
distribution. The company is obligated to deliver the water to the shareholder's place of use.
Many mutual irrigation companies have taken the position that they
have the exclusive right to file a change application or otherwise take
formal action affecting the water rights of the company. Articles of Incorporation of mutual companies occasionally provide that the water is
perpetually tied to the land upon which it is used as a means of deterring
the movement of irrigation water to other land outside the companies'
distribution systems. It has been this writer's experience that mutual
companies frequently protest any effort by a shareholder to change either
the nature of use or place of use of his water represented by shares of
stock in the mutual corporation.
The mutual irrigation company is really nothing more than a corporate
water master.75 Shareholders are the only ones entitled to use water. The
right to make a change of use is an inherent, pre-existing part of the
water right. It is not dependent upon statutory authorization.76 Under most
change of use statutes, the party entitled to the use of water is the party
72. Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Coto. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975); East River Bottom Water
Co. v. Boyle, 102 Utah 149, 128 P.2d 277 (1942).

73. East River Bottom Water Co., 102 Utah 149, 128 P.2d 277.
74. Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P2d 930 (1938).

75. Pacific States Savings and Loan Corp. v. Schmitt, 103 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1939); Slosser v.
Salt River Valloy Canal Co., 7 Ariz. 376, 65 P. 332 (1901); Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 15 Utah 2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964); Salt Lake City v. East Jordan lrr. Co., 40 Utah 126,

121 P 592 (1911).
76. C. KINNEY, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RtGIGTs, § 1487, at 2674
(2d ed. 1912) states.

The shareholders in mutual water corporations have certain individual rights which
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entitled to make a change of use." Efforts by mutual irrigation companies
to deprive their shareholders of their legal right to effect a change of use
clearly promote inefficiency and may even constitute an unlawful restraint
on alienation or be ultra vires. The prior appropriation doctrine should
be interpreted to promote alienation of these shares.
On the other hand, the movement of a large block of water out of a
company's system for use on other lands and for other purposes could
harm the remaining shareholders of the company. At a minimum, it could
cause some disruption and expense in adjusting distribution schedules
and modifying diversion or distribution facilities to respond to the transfer.
Where this occurs, the shareholder causing the harm should bear the costs
of mitigation. If mitigation cannot occur, the change of use ought to be
denied-as in the case of any other change application.
Another problem relating to the transfer of shares involves the hydrological interconnection of all the rights. Water diverted into the company's
system jointly shares conveyance losses with all other users and contributes to the company's return flow available to downstream water users.
If a shareholder withdraws all of the water represented by his or her shares
in the company, the other shareholders may well, in the future, bear a
disproportionate share of the future seepage and conveyance losses and
downstream users may be denied return flow they previously received.
These disgruntled users may look to the company to recoup their losses.
This type of harm should be mitigated by imposing conditions on the
sale. A shareholder seeking to move his or her water out of the company's
system should be required to leave sufficient water in the system to meet
his or her proportionate share of the conveyance losses and return flow
compensation to the downstream users. This action should avoid any
unreasonable impairment to the other shareholders and would enable the
shareholder to move the balance of his or her water to its intended new
use. This result could be reached through agreement of the parties. The
change application also could be structured to achieve this end result.
The irrigation company will have met its obligations or protecting the
rights of the remaining shareholders and the transferring shareholder will
are not released by the conveyance of their water interest to such a corporation, in
which they may exercise, provided the rights of other shareholders, or other corporations, are not injured thereby. It therefore follows that the shareholder has the right
to change the points of diversion if other persons are not injured. So a shareholder
has the right under the same conditions, such that others are not injured thereby, to
either change the place of use of the water furnished by such company or the sell the
shares to others who make such a change. So, also, the shareholders in a mutual ditch
company may enjoin the company from disposing of any of the water diverted to other
persons and to bona fide share-holders in the corporation, where the effect of this
would be to deprive such shareholders of some of the water to which they are entitled.
77. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (Supp. 1988).

Spring 19891

CHANGING DEMAND FOR WATER USE

be allowed to exercise his or her legal right of change. Any potential
harm to the company or its remaining shareholders will have been addressed.
A shareholder's change application should be allowed to stand or fall
on its own merits, like any other change application. It should not be
defeated by the erroneous argument that the mutual company alone has
the right to authorize a change of use.
This writer believes it is desirable to obtain the company's consent to

a shareholder change application where that is possible. Consent, however, is not always possible to obtain and it should not be legally required
of the shareholder as a condition of approval. So long as the change of
use does not unreasonably interfere with the company or its shareholders,
the change of use should be approved regardless of whether the company

has given its consent or not. The case law supports this proposition.
The landmark case regarding the ability and right of a shareholder to
change his point of diversion, place, or nature of use is Wadsworth Ditch
Company v. Brown.7" There, a shareholder sought to move his water to
lands which were not irrigated under the company's distribution system.
The defendant ditch company complained that the shareholder could not
change the water out of the company's system. The Colorado Supreme
Court held that a change could be made so long as it imposed no additional
burdens on the company or other shareholders. This rule was reaffirmed
by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1975 in Jacobucci v. DistrictCourt,79
where the Court unequivocally held that shareholders have the right to
change the place of use if other water users-including other shareholders-are not impaired by the change. The courts of the few jurisdictions that have address this issue have generally followed the Colorado
rule ."
78. 39 Colo, 57, 88 P. 1060 (1907).
79. 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).
80. Knowles v. Clear Creek Platte River & Mill Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 209, 32 P. 279 (1893);
Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork Iff. Co., 97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939); Baird v. Upper Canal If.
Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060 (1927); George v. Robison, 23 Utah 79, 63 P. 819 (1901). But see
Consolidated People's Ditch Co. v. Foothill Ditch Co., 205 Cal. 54, 269 P. 915 (1928); Fort Lyon
Canal Co. v. Catlin Canal Co., 762 P.2d 1375 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the parties may by contract
(corporate by-laws) impose reasonable limitations on the statutory rights of an appropriator); Johnson
v. Pleasant Valley Irr. Co., 69 Idaho 139, 204 P.2d 434 (1949) (holding that, pursuant to statute,
the irrigation company's consent was required).
The shareholder who transfers his or her water out of the company's distribution system still
remains a shareholder of the company. As a shareholder, he or she is still subject to annual assessments
by the company to pay its annual operation and maintenance expenses. The shareholder must pay
or subject his or her shares to statutory sale for non-payment, notwithstanding the fact that he or
she no longer has any water being distributed through the company's system. Wadsworth Ditch Co.
v. Brown, 39 Colo. 57, 88 P. 1060 (1907); In Re Rice, 50 Idaho 660, 299 P. 664 (1931); Twin
Falls Canal Co. v. Shippen, 46 Idaho 787, 271 P. 578 (1928).
The company should also be able to impose reasonable conditions on such a change to protect

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

IVol. 29

CONCLUSION
The prior appropriation doctrine can be an instrument of change. It
can be used effectively to promote more efficient utilization of appropriated water. It can facilitate the reallocation of existing rights to new (but
not necessarily economic) uses, and protect uses that are perceived to be
more in the public's interest. Through proper administration, State Engineers may force an appropriator to relinquish his or her claim so that
the water becomes available for beneficial use by others.
Uncertainties in the law need to be resolved in our favor of creating
incentives to conserve and better use our existing appropriated water
resources. When this occurs, water rights will more freely move in the
market place to other uses. If the appropriators do not react to marketplce
incentives, State Engineers should use their public interest powers to
provide additional incentives to investors and other water users to undertake conservation measures as an alternative to developing additional
water supplies.
The author has demonstrated that the prior appropriation doctrine has
adapted and will continue to adapt to change. While the system is far
from perfect, the potential clearly is there.
Some argue that change in the prior appropriation doctrine is not fast
enough to satisfy the "public will." The public's will, however, often
shifts like the wind. The wholesale reallocation of vested water rights
through the assertion of the Public Trust Doctrine" is not the best way
to address the reallocation issues. The basis of prior appropriation is the
notion that water is a marketable commodity. Water rights will be allocated
to new uses by the current appropriators or their successors in interest
when the right economic incentives exist to cause it to occur.
Reallocation has a cost. Society must determine who should bear or
who can best bear the cost of reallocation. If reallocation is forced through
the application of the Public Trust Doctrine or through too aggressive use
of the State Engineer's public interest powers, the costs of reallocation
will likely be unfairly heaped on the agricultural water user. That user
will be told that the property right he or she once had is reduced or gone
because the courts have redefined the rules of the game.
The erosion of the "vested water right" in the 1980s is troubling at
best. The costs of forced reallocation are steep. Whether those costs should
be borne by the irrigators alone, or should be shared by those who seek
the rights of the remaining shareholders. These conditions should not be so onerous that they make
it physically or economically impossible for the shareholder to exercise his or her legal fight to make
a change of use. They should, however, protect the interests of the remaining shareholders to ensure
that their rights are not impaired by the change.
81. See cases cited supra note 10.
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to take these water rights from their appropriator and out of economic
use and apply it to some public trust use is an interesting philosophical
question. The debate is likely to continue for many years to come. The
author believes that debate should not be forced upon private water uses
today if our existing system is capable of accommodating existing needs.
The prior appropriation doctrine can assist in the reallocation process
if it is given the time and opportunity to do so. The doctrine is inherently
flexible. It can be molded by the courts and legislatures to accommodate
our changing social values. The evolutionary process occurs slowly, however, and may move too slowly to satisfy all segments of society. If
change is forced, the results may not justify the costs.

